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The rich nation is the novelty, and the development that 
makes entire nations rich is itself the pivotal development of 
modern history 
(Asa Briggs, British historian, 1963) 
Abstract 
Seen in historical perspective the main economic predicaments of the present world (such as poverty, 
inequality, backwardness) appear in a somewhat different light than in many current discussions, especially 
by sociologists, radical economists and political scientists. In the present paper the achievements of the 
modern age, and in particular of the post- World War II period, are considered in the perspective of 
economic and demographic history, and in their connection with the systems of production and of 
international relations. Some considerations concerning future possible developments conclude the paper. 
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1.  Introduction and outline 
We live in a very unequal world plagued by poverty. Overall, economic progress is 
perceived as too slow, as the advance of “globalization” renders the inequalities and 
miseries of the world less tolerable than in the past. There is a widespread rejection in 
some quarters (radical economists, sociologists, and political scientists in particular) of 
the economic institutions of the modern world (identified under the garb of 
“capitalism” and “globalization”).1 However, from the perspective of economic history 
the present state of the world appears in a different light. A rather uncontroversial fact 
is that never in the history of mankind have there been so many paupers as in the 
present times. But the basic reason for this is that never have there been so many people 
around. Indeed, never in the history of the world has the percentage of (absolutely) poor 
people been so low. Moreover, quite recently even the absolute number of the very 
poor has kept decreasing. Economic inequality in the world as a whole has probably 
never been so high, but the reason is not, as is sometimes hinted, that the lot of the 
poorer has worsened, but the dramatic, albeit unequally distributed, economic 
betterment of the many. At the same time the propensity towards economic inequality 
(as captured by the extraction ratio, defined below) has probably never been so low in 
historical times. The green revolution and technological progress have contributed to 
                                                 
1  For a sympathetic survey of those opinions see Zolo (2007) , and for a reference to other contributions 
in the same vein see McCloskey, 2009, pp. 33-34. For a confutation of all sort of widespread anti-
globalization prejudices and conventional opinions see Bhagwati, 2004. For a forceful defence of 
capitalist globalization see Norberg (2003).  
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decisively overcome the Malthusian trap and to bring about an impressive demographic 
explosion. Indeed, never in the history of the world has economic and demographic 
growth been so rapid as after WWII, greatly favoured by the absence of major wars, 2 of 
the sort that were endemic in the past, and by the extraordinary expansion of 
international exchange. The price to pay has been the lingering of the world on the 
brink of a global nuclear catastrophe, as well as the freezing of frontiers and national 
aspirations (which have surged again with a vengeance after the end of the Cold War). 
But Malthusian traps, and different forces threatening the destabilization of relatively 
peaceful world coexistence (such as the inevitable diffusion of nuclear capabilities and 
the raise of nationalism in some quarters) are looming, with the potentiality of drawing 
the post-war period of overall peaceful economic and demographic growth eventually to 
a close. 
2.  Poverty 
Historically world population has been increasing at a very slow pace, amounting 
to near stagnation, held in check by high mortality rates, especially of child mortality. 
Per capita incomes have been mostly at what we would regard utter poverty levels, and 
whenever they have increased they have done so at a very slow pace, amounting, in the 
very long run, to some small fraction of one percent yearly. Following the industrial 
revolution things have started radically to change. But never have world population and 
world income increased so tumultuously as after the Second World War; indeed, the 
explosion both in wealth and population in this post-war period has been an historical 
unicum. Scientifically speaking, from the perspective of the history of mankind the 
anomaly to be explained is not backwardness and poverty, but development and wealth. 
The brakes that in the previous epochs constrained the growth of world population, and 
which started to slacken following the Industrial Revolution,3 have been swept away by 
the progressive lengthening in life expectancy, leading to unprecedented demographic 
growth, which has been accompanied by unprecedented economic growth. 
Still, a large part of humanity lives in appalling poverty conditions. Indeed, there 
has never been such a high number of poor people in the world as in the post WWII 
period. If conventionally (very conventionally, indeed) we define, following the World 
Bank, as (absolute) poverty a daily consumption of less that two dollars,4 their number 
                                                 
2  This means all-out wars between major military powers. Of course there was no want of “minor” 
conflicts (for a list of them and an estimate of their presumed victims see Balint, 1996), but for relative 
intensity and proportion of victims in the global world population they were apparently of much lesser 
importance than in other epochs. 
3  Or more exactly, following the scientific revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that has 
led first to the Industrial Revolution and, subsequently, through the medical and public hygiene 
innovations it was able to conjure, to the Mortality Revolution of the second half of the nineteenth 
century and later, coinciding with the times of what has been dubbed the Second Industrial Revolution 
(cf. Easterlin, 1996, pp. 7-9, 23-29, 69 f.). 
4  In the text we use the colloquially usual distinction of 1 and 2 dollars a day. Recently the World Bank 
has updated its definitions following a revised and extended appraisal of PPP exchange rates. The data 
in the tables 1 and 2 are according to the new definition. We shall deal with these issues in the next 
section. Poverty, Population, Inequality, and Development: the Historical Perspective 
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in 2005 is estimated at 2.560 billion, more than the entire world population in 1950.5 
The number of extreme poor consuming less than one dollar a day in 2005 is reckoned 
to have been higher than 1.1 billion, about the same as the entire world population in 
1820 (which may be conventionally taken as the year of the coming of age of the 
Industrial Revolution in the UK and the start of its spreading abroad); the number of 
the extreme poor in previous years is estimated to have been even higher, about 1.9 
billion around 1980 (before the recent tumultuous growth of the economy of China). 
Most of them are concentrated in third world countries, but a few millions are living in 
(and a number of them leaving from) Eastern Europe and Central Asia (the so called 
transition countries).6 See the data in the tables 1 and 2:  
Table 1. Number of people living with less than 2$ a day (millions)  
Region 1981  2005 
East Asia & Paciﬁc 1,278  728 
of which China  972  473 
Europe & Central Asia
a 35  41 
Latin America & Caribbean   89  94 
Middle East & North Africa  46  51 
South Asia  799  1,09 
Sub-Saharan Africa  291  555 
Total  2538  2560 
Excluding China  1,566  2,142 
Source: Word Bank (2009), table 2.8, P.70.  a) 66 in 1999. 
2.1  Poverty and transition  
It is notable that the number of the poor in transition countries as a whole has 
reached a peak in 1999, just a visible sign of the hardship engendered by the transition 
process during the nineties, but since then it has started to decrease. The same applies to 
the percentage of the poor in the population.7 The dynamics of the poverty rates is just 
a manifestation of the overall costs of transition, as borne out by the dynamics of 
national income and, in the case of the former USSR, of vital statistics (see tables 5, 7 
and 9 below). The psychological hardship of the new poor in transition countries could 
have been made worse “by the drop from earlier achieved levels and expectations, and 
the loss of security” (Nuti, 2009). But in comparison to the countries where poverty was 
                                                 
5   See table 1. We refer to the World Bank data as the most authoritative, even by no means 
uncontroversial, source. The accuracy of World Bank data is challenged in particular by Bhalla (2002) 
who estimates a significantly lower number of absolute poor and a much faster decrease in poverty in 
the two decades of accelerated globalization, between 1980 and 2000.  
6  The data in the fourth row of the two tables below refer to Europe and Central Asia, but the poor in 
the area are essentially concentrated in the transition countries of Eastern Europe (including South-
Eastern Europe) and of the former Soviet Union. 
7 Cf. Wold Bank (2009), p. 70.  
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more permanent and more widespread the new poor in transition countries could 
benefit of the household goods accumulated in the past and of a better chance to be 
helped by better off friends and relatives. 
Table 2. Number of people living with less than 1.25$ a day (millions) 
Region 1981  2005 
East Asia & Paciﬁc 1072  316 
 China  835  208 
Europe & Central Asia
a 7  17 
Latin America & Caribbean  47  45 
Middle East & North Africa  14  11 
South Asia  548  596 
Sub-Saharan Africa  211  388 
Total  1,898  1,373 
Excluding China  1063  877 
Source: as in the table above. a)24 in 1999 
2.2  The world poor as a percentage 
But on the whole the share of the poor in the human population has never been 
so low. According to the historical estimates reported in Bourguignon and Morrison 
(2002, pp. 731-732), and taking into account the number of conventional poor people in 
2005, estimated by the World Bank (2009), as well as the estimate of the size of world 
population in 2005, reported in table 3, the share of world population living in poverty 
diminishes from 94,4% in 1820 to 39% in 2005, that of those living in extreme poverty 
from 83,9 in 1820 down to 21% in 2005. In the end, taking into account the fact that in 
the period the share of the poor has greatly diminished, the fundamental explanation of 
why there are so many poor people in the world is that there are so many people 
around. Indeed, human population has increased steadily and dramatically in the last 
two centuries, and in particular in the last few decades. Some relevant data are reported 
in table 3. 8  To grasp the extent of the dramatic acceleration of population growth in 
recent times one may notice that the increase in population in the ten years between 
1995 and 2005 (796 million) is more or less the same as that in the 10,000 years or so 
from the start of the agricultural revolution till the dawn of the industrial revolution (for 
which we may conventionally take the year 1750). Looking at the first lines of the table, 
comparing them with the last ones, one is forced to come to terms with the fact that the 
                                                 
8  The data from 1800 in Europe and from 1900 in the other continents are regarded, by and large, to 
have a fair degree of reliability. The data concerning the previous years are just estimates or, even, more 
or less wild guesses. They should be considered to give an order of magnitude, rather than provide 
reliable data with any degree of precision (on this see Caldwell and Schindlmayr, 2002). Indeed, this 
applies even more to the estimates concerning national income in the tables that follow.  Poverty, Population, Inequality, and Development: the Historical Perspective 
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momentous historical events of our distant past, recollected and magnified in history 
books, involved such comparatively insignificant numbers of people. 
Table 3 Human population in the course of history (in millions) 
8000 BC  5  
1000 BC  50  
500 BC  100  
1 AD  231  
1000   268  
1500 438   
1600  556  
1700 603   
1750   790  
1800 980   
1820  1,041 
1870 1,271 
1913  1,791  
1950 2,535   
1960  3,032  
1970 3,699   
1980  4,451  
1990 5,295 
1995  5,719  
2001 6,148 
2005  6,515  
2010  6,815 April 2010, as projected according to 
the World population clock 
The sources of the data are as follows: 8000 BC, Haub, 1995, p. 5, quoted in US Census Bureau (2007a); 1000 and 
500 BC, McEvedy and Jones, 1978, pp. 342-351, quoted in US Census Bureau (2007a); 1-1700 and 1820-1913, 
Maddison (2006), p. 636; 1750 and 1800, United Nations, 1999; 1950-2005, United Nations, 2008, with the 
exception of 2001, taken from US Census Bureau 2007b.  
2.3  The evaluation of poverty 
Of course the above depends crucially on the definition of the poor. Here we use 
the World Bank definition, whereby the poor are defined in terms of absolute 
purchasing power, establishing “a realistic lower bound for the minimum … level of 
consumption to meet basic human needs” (World Bank, 2008, p. 2). This may not well  
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correspond to a subjective, socially and environmentally conditioned, definition of 
poverty, in the sense of deprivation (see on this point, in particular, Kenny, 2006). 9 
Subjective deprivation may be a function of achieved living standards, and 
increasing expectations, while relative poverty depends on distribution. Subjective 
poverty depends on habits and aspirations, where the latter increase with the diffusion, 
facilitated by the means of mass communication, of the consumption models of the 
better off. Notwithstanding all these complex qualitative aspects of poverty, without a 
common quantitative measure one could hardly make intertemporal comparisons. Of 
course, in making them one should ideally go into detail as to the specific relevant 
circumstances of the various cases (possibly extending the narrative to the whole range 
of Sen’s capabilities). Here we may be content to note that the trends in average 
incomes are corroborated by comparable trends in vital statistics such as in particular 
life expectancy (see tables 7 and 9 below), which refer to important qualitative aspects of 
living standards. 
How are the poverty benchmarks of the World Bank at 1$ a day and 2$ a day 
determined? Basically the first refers to the average national poverty level of a set of the 
poorest countries of the world, and the second to the average national poverty level of 
the developing countries as a whole. Recently the World Bank has revalued the 
dimension of world poverty, following a new expanded data base of household income 
and expenditure surveys, and a new comprehensive assessment of PPP (Purchasing 
Power Parity) exchange rates. In particular the internal price level in a number of poor 
countries has turned out to be higher than previously understood, and thus the 
purchasing power of international dollars lower. A reason advanced is that the lower 
quality of goods consumed by the poor in poorer countries was not sufficiently 
accounted for.10 A new extreme poverty benchmark level has been set at 1.25 US$ of 
2005 international purchasing power, and the new poverty level at 2 US$ of 2005 
international purchasing power. According to the new criteria extreme poverty is more 
widespread than according to the old. However the dynamic aspect of world poverty 
has remained qualitatively the same, since even with the new estimates “over 15 years 
global poverty fell by an average of 1 percentage point a year” (World Bank, 2008, p.1). 
“Global poverty measured at the $1.25 a day line has been decreasing since the 1980s. 
The number of people living in extreme poverty fell from 1.9 billion in 1981 to 1.8 
billion in 1990 to about 1.4 billion in 2005” (ibidem, p. 10). The criteria used for defining 
extreme poverty according to the new benchmarks are still the same as before—“the 
poverty line typical of the poorest countries of the world” establishing “a realistic lower 
bound for the minimum… level of consumption to meet basic human needs” (ibidem, 
pp. 1-2). In particular, “the new extreme poverty line is set at $1.25 a day in 2005 PPP 
                                                 
9  Kenny emphasizes the negative impact of increasing expectations and new consumer goods on welfare 
or happiness. But happiness is a rather subjective matter, well expressed by the Italian poet Metastasio: 
“Se a ciascun l'interno affanno si leggesse in fronte scritto, quanti mai, che invidia fanno, ci farebbero 
pietà!” (“If everybody’ s internal pain were written on his forehead, many who are envied now, would be 
pitied instead.”) As economists, we may content ourselves of dealing with per capita incomes, but with 
many caveats, among others of the kind argued by Kenny. On happiness and economic growth see also 
Easterlin, 1996, pp. 131-144 
10  Cf. World Bank, 2008, pp. 3,8. Poverty, Population, Inequality, and Development: the Historical Perspective 
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terms, which represents the mean of the poverty lines found in the poorest 15 countries 
ranked by per capita consumption” (ibidem, p. 22). In turn $2 a day in 2005 PPP terms 
represents the median poverty line for the developing countries of the world (ibidem, p. 
10). 
3.  An unequal world 
While a considerable share of world population still lives in poverty, world income 
and wealth are very unequally distributed. A recent research by Wider, the ONU 
economic research centre on poverty and development11 (Davis et al., 2006a), shows the 
extent of world inequality in the distribution of personal wealth: 12  
Considering all the data in PPP$ (Purchasing Power Parity Dollars) terms the 24 
richer OECD countries own 64% of world private wealth, with only 15% of world 
population, and a per capita wealth of 114,000 PPP$. The 64 poorest countries with 
40% of world population own 8% of world personal wealth , with a per capita wealth of 
5000 PPP$.13 In 2000 the 1% richest adults owned the 32% of overall private wealth14; 
the poorest 50%, 4% .15 The Gini index of inequality of overall world wealth 
distribution is given as 80 in PPP$ terms16, 89 calculated using current exchange rates, 
the same as that of a group of 10, where a single person has 1000, and the remaining 
nine 1 each.17 
Income is distributed less unequally than wealth, but still in a markedly unequal 
way. According to most estimates, reported in Milanovic (2006, p. 8), the Gini 
coefficient of world income distribution is around 65% in the contemporary world.18 To 
make a comparison, the Gini index of the distribution of family incomes of Italy is 
reported (in CIA, 2009) as 32, of the USA 45, of Sweden 23. The state where the Gini 
index appears to be highest is Namibia with 71, but perhaps only because in other, even 
more unequal less developed countries endowed with plenty of natural resources no 
statistical data allowing its calculation are available. 19 
                                                 
11  World Institute for Development Economics Research: http://www.wider.unu.edu. 
12  Where personal wealth is defined as “the value of physical and financial assets less liabilities” (Davies et 
al., 2006a, p. 1). The data refer to the year 2000. For a detailed explanation of the methods used in the 
inquiry one may refer to the above source. 
13  Ibidem, Table 8. 
14  “37% reside in the US, 27% in Japan” (Davies et al., 2006b). 
15  Davies et al., 2006a, Table 10, and Table 11a. 
16  Ibidem, Table 12. 
17  Davies et al., 2006b, p. 9. 
18    The paper by Milanovic contains an interesting critical review of the different methodological 
approaches used to get those values. The subsequent estimates by Baten et al. (2009) present more or 
less the same results. 
19  Such as Equatorial Guinea that has a per capita income higher than  Germany or the UK (CIA 2010), 
but where the great bulk of the population allegedly lives in desperate conditions (cf. “Playboy waits for 
his African throne “, Sunday Times, 3/9/2006, available at: 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article626511.ece).  
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3.1 Inequality  between  nations  and inequality inside nations 
Looking back at history it appears that in the past (before the “great 
divergence”
20) income differences inside nations were relatively more relevant than 
nowadays in the determination of global inequality. In the pre-industrial world more 
than half of global income inequality could have been due to inequality in income 
distribution  inside nations, while today the prevailing component, about 70%, is 
deemed to be due to differences in average per-capita incomes between nations 
(Milanovic, 2006, p. 9). On the other hand in more recent times the weight of the inside 
nations component seems to have somewhat increased, but the trend is not uniform in 
the different regions of the world.
21  
Table 4. Poverty and income distribution in recent world history 
year 
Gini coefficient of 
world income 
distribution 
Percentage of 
the population 
living in poverty 
Percentage of the 
population living in 
extreme poverty 
1820 0.500  94.4  83.9 
1850  0.532  92.5  81.5 
1870 0.560  89.6  75.4 
1890  0.588  85.7  71.7 
1910 0.610  82.4  65.6 
1929  0.616  75.9  56.3 
1950 0.640  71.9  54.8 
1960  0.635  64.3  44 
1970 0.650  60.1  35.6 
1980  0.657  55  31.5 
1992 0.657  51.3  23.7 
2001  0.657 (0.699)
a  44  18 
Data taken from Bourguignon and Morrison (2002, p. 731); the percentages of the two right cells of the last row are 
calculated from population data in table 3 and Word Bank poverty data according to the older 1$ - 2$ methodology (which 
is used by Bourguignon and Morrison). aCalculation from 2002 World Income Distribution Database in Milanovic 
(28/12/2007); the figure between brackets is calculated using the recently revised set of PPP$ exchange rates.  
The greater growth rate of less developed countries as a whole should be a factor 
leading to the reduction of the between nations component, while increased inequality 
inside developed countries is a factor contributing to the increased inside world 
inequality component. According to the data reported in Bourguignon and Morrison 
(2002, p. 731) there has been an increase through time in the world Gini coefficient, 
from 50 in 1820 up to the present values (see table 4). Values for so far away periods 
seem to be rather speculative estimates, even more daring than the speculative estimates 
                                                 
20  Cf. Pomeranz, 2000. 
21  Cf. Nel, 2006, p. 697I; IMF, 2007, pp. 138 f. Poverty, Population, Inequality, and Development: the Historical Perspective 
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needed to arrive at an aggregate measure for the contemporary world as a whole.
22 But it 
seems plausible that income inequality should have been lower in the past, owing to the 
fact that the great bulk of the population was living close to subsistence level, and given 
the low overall average per capita incomes. In a recent paper Milanovic (2009) revises 
the estimates of Burguignon and Morrison, arriving at some interesting quantitative 
conclusions: The global Gini coefficient for 1820 is reduced to 43. The Gini coefficient 
measuring inequality between nations (where individual incomes inside any given nation 
are taken as equal to the average value) rises from 15 to 32 between 1820 and 1870, 
increasing up to 55-60 in the after WWII period, showing some reduction in the last 
twenty years due to the economic progress of China and India, in particular. Between 
1820 and the present times, the between countries component of the global world 
inequality index rises from 35 to 80-85 percent. 
 
Fig. 1 The maximum possible Gini coefficient as a function of average income 
 
4.  Poverty, inequality, and maximum potential inequality 
According to table 4, while world income inequality, as measured by the Gini 
coefficient, has steadily increased since 1820 (an increase of the coefficient between 
                                                 
22   And indeed the methodological approach of the two authors appears to be particularly rough. See on 
this regard Milanovic, 2009, pp. 2-3; Baten et al., 2009. On the other hand the results of the latter study, 
pursued through an alternative, but also rough, methodological approach confirm on the whole 
Bourguignon and Morrison’s results.  
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31% and 40%, according to the two different estimates of the 2001 value), the 
proportion of paupers in the world has steadily decreased. Under primitive conditions, 
when per capita incomes are close to the subsistence level, the amount of surplus the 
economy can produce above physical subsistence level is limited. This limits the 
percentage of national income that can be appropriated by the elite, and thus the 
maximum level of the inequality measure (such as the Gini coefficient or the Theil 
index) that can be possibly achieved, assuming an elite dimensionally nought in relation 
to the whole population (see fig. 1). As per capita levels increase, this leads to an 
increase in the percentage of the national income that can be accounted for as surplus 
above subsistence, and to an increase in the maximum achievable inequality, as 
measured, say, by the maximum Gini coefficient compatible with the maintenance of 
the mass of the population at the physical subsistence level,23 and thus with the minimal 
condition ensuring persistence in its actual dimensions of the given society over time.24 
Thus we may consider as a true measure of the extent of inequality achieved by a given 
society not the inequality index (such as the Gini coefficient) per se, but the percentage 
achieved of the maximum inequality index compatible with a given per capita income 
level. According to the definition in Milanovic (2009) and Milanovic et al. (2007), this is 
the inequality extraction ratio (from now on ier). With the increase in world per capita 
income following the industrial revolution the maximum possible inequality index, 
which may be measured in terms of Gini coefficient or of Theil index, progressively 
increases. According to Milanovic (2009, p. 18) the maximum possible world Gini 
coefficient increases from 56 in 1820 to 95 in 2005. As we have seen from the 
Bourguignon-Morrison (henceforward BM) data the actual world Gini coefficient has 
increased, but at a lower rate than the maximum possible Gini coefficient. Taking the 
data of table 4 this means that the inequality extraction ratio decreases from 
50/56=89% in 1820 to 66/95=70% or to 70/95=74% (in case of the higher Gini 
estimate) in 2005. However, Milanovic (2009) estimates the Gini coefficient in 1820 to 
the lower level of 43, and this leads to a much lower reduction in the extraction ratio 
between 1820 and 2005, from 43/56=77% to 74 or 70%. In terms of the Theil index, 
however, the reduction in ier is much more relevant, halving from 70 in 1820 to 35% in 
2005 (p. 18). Even the almost invariant Gini extraction ratios of the latter estimate 
however hide quite a deep change: while the inequality extraction ratio inside nations 
has on average strongly decreased, the between nations component of inequality, and of 
the inequality extraction ratio, has markedly increased. We can arrive therefore at the 
                                                 
23  As Milanovic (2004, p. 24) puts it: “Average income levels also set an upper boundary on inequality. … 
As societies develop, income inequality has the ‘space’ to grow simply because there is a surplus which 
can be appropriated or redistributed among members of the society.” 
24  In a Malthusian perspective the population itself can be seen as a function of the overall income that is 
allocated in supplying subsistences. By given resources and technology, whenever decreasing returns set 
in there are two conflicting effects of population increase on the size of surplus: 1. by any given per 
capita surplus, more people bring in more total extractable surplus; 2. but more people reduce per capita 
surplus. If the relationship is perceived, it can affect, in theory at least, the extraction and population 
policy of the elite, since under pre-industrial circumstances more extraction can bring about a 
population reduction, less extraction an increase. It can be easily seen in this respect that in the long run 
the size of the population that allows the maximum surplus extraction is when the marginal productivity 
of labour is equal to the subsistence wage, while the maximum possible population is when there is no 
surplus at all and per capita income is equal to the subsistence wage. Poverty, Population, Inequality, and Development: the Historical Perspective 
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conclusion, on the basis of the degree of the decrease of inequality extraction ratio 
inside nations, that on the whole the propensity towards inequality has very much 
decreased, and the responsibility for the increased world inequality between 1820 and 
present times is entirely of the “great divergence”, the dramatic increase in the well 
being of the economically more advanced countries. The overall trend towards the 
decrease of the extraction ratio inside nations could have been a consequence of the 
changed nature of political and economic institutions and of greater economic and 
social complexity, both causes and consequences of modern economic growth.  
Table 5. Yearly average rates of population growth 1-2007 (in percentages) 
  1-
1000 
1000-
1500 
1500-
1820 
1820-
1870 
1870-
1913 
1913-
1950 
1950-
1973 
1973-
2001 
2001-
2007 
Western 
Europe  0.06 0.16 0.26 0.69 0.77 0.42 0.71 0.32 0.26 
Eastern 
Europe  0.03  0.15  0.31  0.77  0.92  0.26  1.01  0.32  -0.03 
Former 
USSR  0.06 0.17 0.37 0.97 1.33 0.38 1.44 0.54 -0.15 
Western 
offshoots
a)  0.05  0.07  0.44  2.86  2.07  1.25  1.54  1.09  0.94 
Latin 
America  0.07 0.09 0.07 1.25 1.63 1.96 2.73 1.96 1.3 
Japan  0.09  0.14  0.22  0.21  0.95  1.32  1.14  0.55  0.06 
Total Asia 
excl. Japan  0.00 0.09 0.29 0.15 0.55 0.92 2.19 1.80 1.29 
Africa  0.07  0.07  0.15  0.40  0.75  1.64  2.37  2.69  2.36 
World  0.01 0.10 0.27 0.40 0.80 0.93 1.93 1.62 1.20 
Source of the data of the last column:, at http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/ipc/agggen; the remaining data are taken from 
Maddison (2006), p. 637. a)USA, Canada, New Zealand, Australia. 
5.  The population explosion  
In a secular (or rather millennial) perspective, before the Industrial Revolution 
population growth was held in check by high mortality rates, which were accompanying 
high birth rates. The source of high mortality rates in a classical Malthusian perspective 
could have been the limitation in the amount of available agricultural resources, either 
continuously, leading to poor nutrition (and therefore to higher morbidity and 
premature deaths), or episodically, through famines. But there were also other forces at 
play.25 First of all very high rates of child mortality, either through systematic infanticide 
                                                 
25   In Malthus’ own words: “The positive checks to population are extremely various, and include every 
cause, whether arising from vice or misery, which in any degree contributes to shorten the natural 
duration of human life. Under this head, therefore, may be enumerated all unwholesome occupations, 
severe labour and exposure to the seasons, extreme poverty, bad nursing of children, great towns,  
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(itself probably a function of available resources), especially of females, or as a 
consequences of neglect and of poor living, childbearing, and childrearing conditions. 
Second, possible neglect of the elders, the disabled and the infirm. Third the spread of 
epidemic diseases (which was favoured by overcrowding and poor living conditions in 
the cities of agricultural societies). Then, endemic warfare, between tribes, nations or 
individuals, leading to direct deaths, spread of disease, 
26 as well as to misdirection and 
destruction of the resources otherwise available for survival.27 Still, following the 
improvements of agricultural technology in particular, as well as the development of the 
trade economy and “Smithian” growth, there was some population growth at a very 
slow pace, slightly accelerating in time, as shown in table 5.28 Later on, especially since 
the middle of the nineteenth century, the decrease in mortality rates that has followed 
with some delay the Industrial Revolution, a true “mortality revolution” “which has 
resulted in doubling or more of average life expectancy at birth”29, has led to a much 
faster population growth. At the same time the demographic consequences of two 
world wars and related upheavals are shown in a temporary decrease of population 
growth rates. The post World War II period has seen an unprecedented population 
explosion, indeed the rate of growth of world population has never been so high as after 
WWII. There are some signs of abating however following increasing living standards 
and progresses in the technology of birth control, spreading from the more advanced 
countries to the lesser developed areas of the world, leading to a forecast of about 9.2 
billion around the year 2050.30 
                                                                                                                                        
excesses of all kinds, the whole train of common diseases and epidemics, wars, plague, and famine.” 
Malthus 1826 [1798], I.II.9. 
26 Such as most famously in the case of the European Black Death of the half of the 14-th century, 
originating allegedly from the siege by the Mongol army (where the plague was endemic) of the 
Genovese trade city of Caffa in Crimea in 1447. 
27    According to Ember (1978) about 60% of the societies of hunter-gatherers of which there is 
documentation were recorded to be at war at least once every two years. Even more drastic is the 
picture traced by Keeley (1996) concerning the propensity to war and violence of ancient and modern 
pre-historical societies (pre-historical in the sense of “people without written history”). As to pre-
industrial civilizations it is enough to recall European and world history (for instance, considering 
European history immediately preceding the Industrial Revolution, in the 16th century 95% of the time 
there were wars involving the major European powers, 94% in the 17th and 78% in the 18th century; see 
Eloranta, 2005). For a broad picture of the frequency of warfare in state and non-state societies see 
Keeley, cit., pp. 32-33, and the literature quoted there.  For the issue of population control in pre-
industrial societies, with a survey of the relevant literature, see Caldwell and Caldwell (2003). 
28   The relation between population growth and agricultural technology was stressed by Boserup (1965), 
even if in Boserup’s work the causal relation was supposed to act in the contrary sense than the one 
implied above; the crucial element being the density of population affecting the length of fallows. 
However this could be really the case if a complete blueprint of alternative agricultural techniques were 
to exist at any given time, not if alternative agricultural techniques had to be discovered, or rediscovered, 
in a lengthy historical process. For a critical assessment of Boserup’s work, see Federico (2001). On the 
other hand Boserup’s argument could be reinterpreted as pointing towards endogenous technological 
progress in agriculture being stimulated by demographic conditions (see on this Cuffaro, 2001, pp. 67 
f.).  
29  Easterlin, 1996, p. 1. 
30  Cf. United Nations, 2008. Poverty, Population, Inequality, and Development: the Historical Perspective 
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Table 6. Average Life Expectancy for Groups A and B, 1000–1999 (years at birth; average for both sexes) 
  1000   1820   1900   1950   1999 
Group A   24   36   46   66   78 
Group B   24   24   26   44   64 
World   24   26   31   49   66 
Source: Maddison (2006), p. 33. Group A: Western Europe, Western Offshoots (USA, Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand), and Japan. Group B is the rest of the world. 
What have been the causes of the post World War II world population explosion? 
Essentially the reduction in mortality rates and the increase in life expectancy  (see tables 
6 and 7). The birth rate has on the whole decreased in the post-war period (see table 8), 
but the increase in life expectancy has been stronger: 17 years between 1950 to 1999 in 
the world as a whole, more or less the same as in the first half of the twentieth century, 
three times more than the increase of life expectancy in the crucial eighty years of the 
spread of the industrial revolution, from 1820 to 1900. One may also note that all the 
areas of the world have partaken in the great advance in life expectancy.  Moreover, 
“differences in lifetime survival rates between rich and poor countries and between rich 
and poor individuals within countries were much higher two centuries ago than they are 
now”, and “over the past century, the life span gap between poor and rich countries has 
narrowed dramatically”.
31 Yet, if one looks at more comprehensive data of vital statistics 
the differences between the different regions of the world are still staggering (see table 
9). It is interesting to note, in order to understand what has been accomplished in the 
course of the very short historical span of two centuries, that the worst off in terms of 
life expectancy, the “Africans south of the Sahara survive a bit longer today … (even 
including the impact of AIDS), than did the English in the early nineteenth century 
when they had the world’s longest life spans.”
32 According to Bourguignon and 
Morrison (2002, p. 741) the inequality in world life expectancy started to decrease from 
the beginning of the second quarter of the 20-th century, while the inequality in per 
capita income distribution continued to increase. As to the population explosion in the 
post WWII period, one of the reasons lies in the impact of the Green Revolution in 
third world countries, such as Mexico and India, leading to a strong growth of 
agricultural production, adequate to feed a fast increasing world population.
33 But also 
the improvements in transportation have contributed to avoid major demographic 
                                                 
31 Milanovic et al., 2007, p. 28 and p. 24 
32 Ibidem, p. 26. 
33 With the “Green Revolution” modern agricultural techniques and high productivity seeds were 
imported from the developed world into developing countries through organized efforts spurred first by 
the Rockefeller Foundation (starting from Mexico in 1944), to which the Ford Foundation later joined 
forces. The result was that “the adoption of High Yelding Varieties (HYVs) enormously increased the 
productivity of land and labor” (Federico, 2005, p. 214). For comprehensive statistical data on 
agricultural growth see ibidem, pp. 233 f. However in a number of areas, in particular in Africa, and 
Latin America, the methods of the Green Revolution have encountered fundamental organizational and 
environmental obstacles (on this see Cuffaro, 2001, chapters 5 and. 6, in particular pp. 117 f.). But 
taking into account the increasing integration of the world food market, productivity advances in some 
countries can have a favourable impact on the food balance of others through their effect on world 
prices, anyhow.  
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catastrophes due to starvation that would have negatively impacted on global population 
growth.
34  
 
Table 7. Life expectancy at birth35 
  1820 1900 1950 2007 
Italy  30 43 66 79.9 
Western Europe  36  46  67  79.5 
Eastern  Europe     74.5 
Russia  28  32  65  65.9 
United  States  39 47 68 78 
Japan  34  44  61  82 
Latin  America  27 35 51 72.8 
China  na  24  41  72,9 
India  21 24 32 68.6 
Asia  23  24  40  69 
Africa  23 24 38 52,2 
World  26  31  49  65.8 
More developed countries        76.7 
Less developed countries        64.6 
Sources: Maddison, 2006, p. 32; for 2007 U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base, at http://www.census.gov/cgi-
bin/ipc/idbagg. 
                                                 
34 The only globally relevant demographic catastrophe in the post War II period could have been a 
population deficit of an undetermined (and undeterminable) few tens of millions Chinese as a 
consequence of the famine following Mao’s Great Leap Forward: “a dip in the growth rate from 1959-
1960… was due to the Great Leap Forward in China. During that time, both natural disasters and 
decreased agricultural output in the wake of massive social reorganization caused China's death rate to 
rise sharply and its fertility rate to fall by almost half” (US Census Bureau, 18/7/2007; the dip could be 
graphically seen in the sudden fall in the line of the population growth rate reported in the site of the 
World Population Clock). According to Yao (1999) the demographic deficit in the three years 1959-61 
was somewhat higher than 49 million, of which about 18.5 million extra deaths and the rest lost births. 
Not a big difference anyway to the size of world population at the time, of about 3 billion. For other 
estimates one could refer to the literature quoted by Yao, in particular Peng Xizhe (1987). 
35  The data concerning life expectancy in pre-modern and modern backward societies are affected by very 
high child mortality rates, while adult life expectancy can be much higher. For instance in a demographic 
regime such as in the Mopti district of Mali in 1957-58 with a total fertility rate (average number of live 
births per woman) of 7.5, life expectancy was 18, but life expectancy at 20 was 48, while in another 
instance, corresponding more or less to the demographic regime of 1650-1750 England, with fertility 
rate 4, life expectancy was 33, but life expectancy at 20 was 55 (Caldwell and Caldwell, 2003, p.  210). Poverty, Population, Inequality, and Development: the Historical Perspective 
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Table 8 Yearly births per 100 population36 
 1820  1900  1950  1999  2007 
Italy  3.9 3.3  1.94    0.93  0.85 
West European Average  3.74  3.08  1.83  1  1(EU) 
East European Average         0.99
a) 
United States  5.52  3.23  2.4  1.44  1.42 
Japan  2.62 3.24  2.81  0.95  0.81 
Russia  4.13  4.8  2.65  0.88  1.09 
Latin American Average     4.19  2.51   
China    4.12  3.7  1.6  1.75 
India   4.58  4.5  2.8  2.27 
Asian Average (without Japan)      4.28  2.3   
African Average     4.92  3.9  3.8 
World      3.74  2.3  2.02 
Source: Maddison, p. 32 (some of the values refer to slightly different years: see the notes in the source); for the year 2007: 
CIA (2007), and, for the African average, PRB (2007). a) Simple average of 17 East-European countries, with values 
ranging from 0.88 (Bosnia) to 1.2 (Macedonia) 
 
                                                 
36   The data reported in the World Factbook for 2007 range from 0.73 (Hong-Kong) to 5.0. It is notable 
that among the 223 countries whose data are reported, 9 of the first 10 positions belong to African 
countries.  
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Table 9. Some vital statistics from WHO, year 200537 
 
Life 
expectancy 
at birth 
Healthy life 
expectancy 
at birth
Adult 
mortality ratea)
Under 5 
mortality 
rateb)
Infant 
mortality 
ratec)
Neonatal 
mortality 
rated) 
Maternal 
mortality 
ratee)
Italy  78 84  71 75 89 46 4 4 3  5
USA  75  80  67  71 137 81 8 7 4  14
Japan  79 86  72 78 92 45 4 3 1  10
Russia  59  72  53  64 470 173 14 11 7  65
India  62 64  53 54 280 207 74 56 39  540
Brazil  68  75  57  62 225 118 33 28 13  260
China  71 74  63 65 155 98 27 23 18  56
South-
East 
Asian 
Region 
62  65  54  55 272 207 68 51 35  460
African 
Region  48 50  40 42 480 438 165 99 40  910
World  64  68  56  59 233 164 74 51 28  400
European 
Union  76 82    5  
Source: WHO, 2007; the last row from CIA (2007). For a definition of the different indicators and the methods used in 
their assessment, see WHO, National Burden of Disease Studies:A Practical Guide. Geneva; WHO, 2001. a)Probability 
of dying aged 15–60 years per 1000 population. b)Probability of dying aged < 5 years per 1000 live births. c)Per 1 000 live 
births. Mortality in the first year of life. d)Per 1 000 live births. Mortality in the first 28 days of life..e)Per 100,000 live 
births. 
6.  Maddison’s statistical summing-up of world economic growth 
Even in the poorest of continents, Africa, per capita income has strongly 
increased (about three times; an unprecedented performance) since the spreading to the 
whole world of the present mode of production that followed the industrial revolution 
(see table 10). This has taken place notwithstanding the rapid population growth, which 
in the post World War II years has become the highest in the world (2.69% yearly in the 
period 1973-2001, somewhat reduced to 2.36% lately; cf. table 5). According to 
Maddison’s statistical account (somewhat daring, owing to the length of the historical 
period covered), per capita income has declined in Western Europe during the first 1000 
years of our era, from 450 PPP$ to 400 (where 400 apparently stays for the physical 
subsistence level), reaching a nadir around 600 AD, and then starting a very slow 
                                                 
37 Some interesting extreme values (giving the existing range), from CIA Factbook (2007): Birth rate 
(births/1000) 50 (Niger)--7,34 (Hong-Kong); death rate (deaths/1000): 30.35 (Swaziland37)--2.16 
(United Arab Emirates); Infant Mortality Rate: 184.84 (Angola)--2.3 (Singapore); Life Expectancy at 
Birth: 83.52 (Andorra)--32.23 (Swaziland); Total Fertility Rate (children born/woman): 7.38 (Mali)---
0.98 (Hong-Kong) (1.50 EU). Poverty, Population, Inequality, and Development: the Historical Perspective 
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recovery.38 In that period the rest of the world fared slightly better, per capita incomes 
being throughout the period somewhat higher in Africa, and in Asia, while the 
remaining regions were still at the low subsistence level. Five hundred years later the 
world as a whole had made some modest progress. Italy was by far the richest country 
but was stagnating until the Industrial Revolution (1820). The territories that were to 
become the Western Offshoots were the poorest, Africa was a little better, but had 
somewhat declined, stagnating until the colonial conquests of the nineteenth century, 
China had progressed to 600PP$, staying at that level until 1820 and declining 
afterwards, Japan also had progressed somewhat. At the threshold of the Industrial 
Revolution, in 1700, the richest world country were the Netherlands, Western Europe 
was somewhat lower than 1000PPP$ on average.39 
Table 10. World Per Capita GDP, Regional Averages, 1-2001 AD (1990 international Geary-Khamis 
dollars)40 
  1   1000   1500  1600  1700  1820  1870  1913  1950   1973   2001 
Western 
Europe   450   400   771  890  998  1,204  1,960  3,458  4,579   11,416   19,256
Eastern Europe   400   400   496  548  606  683  937  1,695  2,111   4,988   6,027 
Former USSR   400   400   499  552  610  688  943  1,488  2,841   6,059   4,626 
Western 
Offshoots  400   400   400  400  476  1,202  2,419  5,233  9,268   16,179   26,943 
Latin America  400   400   416  438  527  692  681  1,481  2,506   4,504   5,811 
Japan   400   425   500  520  570  669  737  1,387  1,921   11,434   20,683 
Asia (excl. 
Japan)   450   450   572  575  571  577  550  658  634   1,226   3,256 
Africa   430   425   414  422  421  420  500  637  894   1,410   1,489 
World   445   436   566  595  615  667  875  1,525  2,111   4,091   6,049 
Source: Maddison, 2006, p. 642. 
Since 1870 economic growth has been accompanied, wherever data are available, 
by a great reduction, in many cases almost a halving, of labour time (Maddison, 2006, p. 
347). And hence by an enormous growth of hourly labour productivity (p. 351): 
notwithstanding the reduction in labour time, production per worker has greatly 
                                                 
38  The data for the year 1 in Western Europe and Asia are considered implausibly low by Federico (2002, 
p. 115). Federico’s viewpoint  is consistent with Milanovic (December 2004) estimate of 840 (p. 22) or 
between 800 and 900 1990-PPP$ (p. 23) as the average per capita income of the Roman empire at the 
times of Augustus. On Maddison’s work see also Valli (2008). 
39  For the detailed country data one is referred to Maddison (2006, p. 639). 
40   For a definition of Geary-Khamis dollars cf. United Nations, 1992. It should be noted that taking 
Geary-Khamis dollars enhances the reported incomes in poorer nations because goods and services 
consumed by them are calculated at the international prices that are closer to those of the richer 
countries where services are relatively more expensive, and thus understates the income inequality 
between nations. This depends on the Gerschenkron effect, whereby the national income of a nation is 
enhanced if calculated at the prices prevailing somewhere else, because in a country relatively more of 
the goods that are relatively cheaper are consumed. Cf. Dowrick and Akmal, 2005, Milanovic 2005b, p. 
125.  
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increased (about ten times since 1870 in Western Europe: Maddison, 2006, p. 349). 
Perusing the above data it becomes obvious that at the time Marx was writing Das 
Kapital  no amount of redistribution could have ever brought about the dramatic 
improvement in the living standards of the masses that technical progress and 
development (“the development of productive forces”) would have brought about in 
less than a life-span. Thus Marx (1875) was right in downplaying the issue of 
distribution as such.
41 Distribution may be important in the short-run for allowing some 
of the worse-off to improve their lot. In the long run for the worse off it is more 
important the relation between distribution, technical improvements, production and 
accumulation. 
Table 11 Growth of Per Capita GDP by Major Regions, 0–1998 (annual average compound growth rate)  
  0–
1000 
1000–
1500 
1500–
1600 
1600–
1700 
1700–
1820 
1820–
1998 
Western Europe  –0.01 0.13  0.14  0.15  0.15  1.51 
Western  Offshoots 0 0  0  0.17 0.78 1.75 
Japan  0.01  0.03  0.03  0.09  0.13  1.93 
Group  A  –0.01 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.18 1.67 
Latin America  0  0.01  0.09  0.19  0.19  1.22 
Eastern Europe & 
former USSR  0  0.04  0.1 0.1 0.1 1.06 
Asia (excluding Japan)  0  0.05  0.01  –0.01  0.01  0.92 
Africa –0.00 –0.01  0  0  0.04  0.67 
Group B  –0.00 0.04  0.02  0  0.03  0.95 
World  –0.00 0.05 0.05 –0.00  0.05 1.21 
Source: Maddison (2006, pp. 30; 643) 
                                                 
41 As “it was in general a mistake to make a fuss about so-called distribution and put the principal stress 
on it.” Poverty, Population, Inequality, and Development: the Historical Perspective 
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Table 12. Growth of Per Capita GDP by Major Region, 1820-2001 (annual average compound growth 
rate) 
  1820–70  1870–1913 1913–50 1950–73 1973–2001 
Western Europe  0.98  1.33  0.76  4.05  1.88 
Eastern Europe  0.63  1.39  0.60  3.81  0.68 
Former USSR  0.63  1.06  1.76  3.35  -0.96 
Western Offshoots  1.41  1.81  1.56  2.45  1.84 
Japan 0.19  1.48  0.88  8.06  2.14 
Latin America  -0.03  1.82  1.43  2.58  1.84 
Asia (excluding Japan)  -0.10  0.42  -0.10  2.91  3.55 
Africa  0.35  0.57  0.92  2  0.19 
World 0.54  1.30  0.88  2.92  1.41 
Source: Maddison (2006, p. 643) 
 
7. The very long perspective of the world economic history according to 
the Malthusian viewpoint 
Fig. 2 The Malthusian trap (“world economic history in one picture” ), according to Gregory Clark  
 
Fig. 1.1, p. 2  in Clark (2007). The graph is by no means accurate since even in the centuries preceding the industrial 
revolution there has been, according to Maddison data, some long-run per capita growth (see table 11). 
 
A possible interpretation of available historical evidence is the Malthusian view. 
Up to the dawn of the industrial revolution the great majority of humans were on the 
brink between physical survival and starvation. In a very long perspective there was by  
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and large a Malthusian equilibrium between population and resources, with a very weak 
long run growth, amounting to near stagnation, of world population.42 Under such 
circumstances the distribution of income and wealth determines in the long run not the 
living standards of the masses but the size of the population: unequal distribution places 
in the hands of  the privileged resources that could allow a larger population to subsist. 
At the same time the existence of privileged strata, which in the short run at least are 
somewhat out of the Malthusian trap, can affect the well being of the worst off through 
the externalities they generate. These could be negative (envy and the sense of relative 
deprivation) or positive (the hope, however slim, to be able to raise among the 
privileged, some identification with their interest and life experience, the possible 
cultural advantages that are mentioned below). Their relative impact may depend, 
among others, on the degree of mobility in the society concerned. Religion could 
surrogate mobility in this world with a belief in mobility in the afterworld. Even in the 
slave society of ancient Rome slaves could have some hope to be liberated, and even to 
become affluent or, in Christian times, to earn after death, like their rich masters, and 
even more than they, the Kingdom of Heaven. The existence of some strata able to 
enjoy a surplus over subsistence could have been an engine (however inefficient) of 
progress in living patterns, and an instrument for providing the resources for some to 
devote themselves to art, technology and science, with eventual long run benefits for 
average living standards, as well as cultural benefits for mankind. 
43 Moreover if a priori, 
under the veil of ignorance, as in Rawls’ paradigm, one had to chose between two 
different possible societies where to live, one with a smaller population in Malthusian 
demographic equilibrium with inequalities, and another one with larger population in 
Malthusian demographic equilibrium with lower or absent inequalities, it is not quite 
clear that the choice would have been for the second alternative, given that to the first 
one, unlike the second, is associated some probability of finding oneself better off, once 
the veil of ignorance is dispelled, than in the egalitarian Malthusian subsistence 
alternative. Aside from nurturing a ruling elite, other surplus utilizations were for 
collective purposes, such as building cathedrals or waging wars, the latter possibly being 
in itself one of the principal instruments, through their disruptive consequences, as well 
as the directly inflicted deaths, of population control. The working of Malthusian limits 
could have affected economic progress negatively, pushing living standards down; 
however greater population density could have led to more advanced production 
techniques and modes of organization, in particular through the division of labour and 
thereby specialisation and increasing returns to scale.44 Moreover, even if the Malthusian 
                                                 
42 Clark’s 2007 book is a recent representation of this viewpoint, which is however rather controversial 
(for a thorough critical review see Allen, 2008). 
43 In the modern world instead the production of cultural goods and of scientific and technical knowledge 
does not require the existence of a privileged elite identified by birth. It is organized, as any other 
branch of production, with the employment of professional workers, whose position in society is 
affected by the embodiment of huge investments in human capital, turning them in their turn in an elite 
of some sort. It concerns in many cases the production of intrinsic public goods, thus with a strong 
participation by the state. Thus it is enormously speedier and more efficient than as a by-product of the 
very existence of elites in older times, and this provides an explanation for the much stronger recent 
economic growth. It is mainly the product of the endeavour of the economically more advanced 
countries, but, owing to its intrinsic public good nature, all the world is able to benefit. 
44 In the development of agriculture this is stressed by Boserup (1965). Poverty, Population, Inequality, and Development: the Historical Perspective 
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trap would have worked in the very long-run, in the shorter run there were long periods 
(such as after the Black Death) when population growth was compatible with some 
improvement in average living standards. Thus in the shorter run how wealth (land 
ownership in particular) was distributed would have made a great deal of difference for 
the well being of the bulk of the population. At the same time the pressure of 
population on resources could have been reduced by reducing the tendency to 
demographic growth, either by decreasing the birth rate or by increasing mortality. 
Historically speaking the increase of mortality and reduction in life expectancy would 
first of all be based on infanticide, but also on high propensity to accidental death in 
later ages. 
7.1  The Malthusian mechanism under pre-agricultural conditions 
In particular looser or absent organized political power under pre-agricultural 
conditions could have made life more precarious and insecure, leading to higher adult 
mortality, and lower pressure on resources, thus allowing higher living adult standards 
than in later, more densely populated, agricultural societies.
45 This could be the reason 
explaining the apparent paradox of the alleged lower living standards in agricultural in 
comparison to hunter-gatherers societies.
46 In the latter people appear on average to be 
better fed and enjoy much more leisure. This could be easily explained if we consider 
that in principle in hunter gathering nomadic societies to hunt and collect more does 
not help to prevent starvation in hard times, since what is above necessities cannot be 
hoarded. The bottleneck to survival would be the occasional times of scarcity. In times 
of abundance there is no point in hunting and foraging more than what is needed for 
comfortable survival, taking into account the relation between possible yield and effort, 
where the former is reduced by the habit of sharing (itself a product of the specific 
conditions of foraging societies). At the same time, if less is hunted or foraged now, 
some more may be available in the future, especially if the foragers are able to reduce 
competition through defence of the territory against other groups. Another method to 
provide for the future as a kind of insurance (because of the expectation of 
reciprocating) is the practice of the sharing through gifts, probably enhanced by the fact 
that whenever a good hunt occurs the excess over current consumption cannot be 
stored, and what can be stored cannot be easily defended if it arises the envy of the 
lesser fortunate. In turn this in primitive societies may weaken the incentive to work,
47 
but at the same time can reduce the extent of the exploitation of natural resources, 
avoiding the “tragedy of the commons”. In agricultural societies it pays to labour all year 
along (even if with different intensity according to the seasons) in order to minimize the 
occurrence of starvation, since provisions can be carried on in time and improvements 
can durably increase the productive capabilities of the earth. So the harder and longer is 
labour the higher the probability of survival. In the end the numbers that a given 
territory can sustain are much higher with agriculture, but the living stiles possibly less 
pleasant. A possible basic Malthusian mechanism for controlling hunter-gatherers 
                                                 
45 For the propensity to violence and warfare of primitive societies and the consequent high death toll in 
proportional terms see Keeley (1996), pp. 28-29; 83-112. 
46 On this see Ember (1978); Diamond (1987); Caldwell and Caldwell (2003). 
47 Cf. Kaplan, 2000.  
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populations can be the occurrence of the occasional lack of food bringing about 
starvation of an usually adequately fed population particularly subjected, because of the 
lack of carry-over, to the vagaries of environmental conditions.
48 The greater the 
population density and the higher the pressure on resources, the higher the probability 
of occasional starvation to occur. In addition, a reason put forward for explaining the 
alleged better living standards of hunter-gatherers in relation to agriculturalists is the 
lower population pressure due to the more limited fertility of the former, associated 
with their specific mobile life style.
49 During the Neolithic Demographic Transition, on 
the contrary, the apparent increase in fertility may be explained by the shift towards the 
sedentary life stile of agriculturalists from the previous nomadic pattern of hunter-
gatherers, and possibly by new opportunities for the earlier weaning of infants.
50 
7.2  Hunter-gatherers and the Zen Economy  
According to an austere vision of the pre-agricultural societies, hunter-gatherers 
were in a Zen economy,
51 where, even if people were living in absolute poverty 
according to our metric, they were quite well off according to another, assumed Zen-like 
metric, where the defining condition is the abundance of leisure and the satisfaction of 
limited wants. Interestingly, this corresponds to the condition of foraging animals in the 
wild (see Winterhalder, 1993); in both cases life could be endowed with leisure but at the 
same time rather short and precarious. Aside from the issue of absolute poverty, hunter-
gatherers societies could have been on the whole relatively egalitarian, so that in terms 
of relative poverty they were rich. On the other hand not all the hunter-gatherers 
societies were egalitarian, for instance there were complex ones where a hierarchical 
organization and even slavery were present (see Fitzhugh, 2003).  
The myth of the "original affluent society” and of the extent of its leisure, as well 
as of its pretended favourable living conditions seemed very suitable for the 1968 
cultural environment where it was conceived, a modern economic version of Rousseau 
“Noble Savage” utopia. In more recent times a more sober reappraisal has been put 
forward. Kaplan (2000), in considering the living standards of one of the surviving 
foraging populations (the !Kung San of Southern Africa), sees rather strange to qualify 
as affluent “a society with a 50 percent childhood mortality rate and a life expectancy at 
birth of about thirty years”. To this it may be added the particularly high death toll (in 
relative terms) as a consequence of warfare in primitive societies.
52 Part of the confusion 
may derive from the apparent better alimentary and health conditions shown by the 
bones of pre-historical hunter-gatherers in relation to those of pre-historical 
                                                 
48 Cf. Kaplan, 2000, p. 311: “One of the perennial problems confronted by virtually all hunter-gatherers is 
not only the seasonal variation in resources, but more significantly the periodic failure of all major 
resources … Unlike agriculturalists, foragers appear to be unable or unwilling to store resources in the 
good times to tide them over the bad times.” 
49 Cf. Bocquet-Appel and Bahr-Yosef, 2008, p. 5. 
50 See Bocquet-Appel and Naji (2006). Of particular interest is the wide discussion of the whole issue, and 
of the specific findings of the authors, by other scholars at the end of the article.  
51 Sahlins, 1968, p. 85. 
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agriculturalists.
53 The inference of a worsening of material conditions (at least as far as 
alimentation is concerned) with the passage to agriculture are translated into the 
atemporal idea of the “original affluent society”, echoing the myth of an ancient blissful 
state of nature. 
8. The take off from the Malthusian Trap, the Industrial Revolution, 
Socialism and Transition  
Thus for almost the totality of human history poverty and starvation have been 
the rule, wealth and affluence a tiny exception in a sea of misery and precarious lives. 
Therefore the real historical singularity that must be explained is not poverty and 
backwardness, but development and wealth. The gigantic increase of population and 
wealth in the last two centuries, and the very rapid (historically speaking) decrease in the 
proportion of the poor have been the outcome of a mode of production characterized 
by the systematic application of scientific principles, and the organized pursuit of 
scientific and technological progress, dramatically improving the living prospects of 
billions of men and women, as a consequence of the basic “idea of the world as open to 
transformation by human intervention.”
54 Its ultimate sources may be found in the 
Renaissance and the Enlightenment, tied together by the Reformation’s critical 
discussion of traditional received faith. The previous period of “Smithian” growth based 
on division of labour, increasing returns and trade could have provided the basic 
economic and institutional background.
55 
Until the Soviet Revolution this mode of production took the organizational form 
and vehicle of transmission of the internal and international capitalist market. This does 
not detract anything from the role performed by the state, in particular as provider of 
public goods and infrastructure, but the basic principle of the functioning of the 
economy was voluntary exchange. It is on the system of voluntary exchange, and the 
creation and expansion of markets, as made possible by the creation of a mercantile 
economy and the gradual establishment of the rule of law and clear attribution and 
protection of property rights, that the success of the Industrial Revolution and its 
aftermath can be attributed. In this may lie the difference with other environments of 
the past (such as historical China or the Arab world at its apogee) where scientific 
progress and innovation did not translate into sustained economic and technological 
progress. Real socialism can be seen just as a specific variety of this mode of production 
whereby the fundamental aspects are upheld through a sort of rough extension of the 
rational organizing principle to the whole of society, and accumulation and innovation 
are organized from the centre rather than having been the outcome of the working of 
market forces. Eventually this daring experiment did encounter a bitter dead end, but in 
                                                 
53 Cf. for instance Cohen, 1991. 
54 Giddens and Pierson, 1998, p. 94. 
55 The fundamental reasons of the “European miracle” and the precise moment of the European 
economic take-off from other relatively advanced societies, such as in particular China, is a highly 
debated historical issue to which many huge tomes have been dedicated, since at least the issue was 
posed by Needham in the fifties. See for instance Jones (1981), Landes (1998), Pomeranz (2000). For a 
recent discussion of this issue, and a reference to the various viewpoints and bibliographical sources, see 
Wagener, 2009, and the thorough review article of Darwin (2008) by Adas (2009) .   
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the process it has partaken both of the increase in population and of the increase in 
aggregate production. Its failure has been a comparative failure, but still its 
achievements in aggregate economic and overall vital statistical terms may be seen as 
substantial in relation to pre-industrial epochs. If we are willing to indulge a little bit in 
counterfactuals, suppose that real socialism had prevailed throughout the world by way 
of revolution and/or military conquest, destroying the international market system in 
the process. It is conceivable that after the initial disruptive consequences of the change 
of system some process of increasing world wealth and population would have persisted 
anyway, at very least by way of capital accumulation and technological diffusion in the 
lesser developed areas. Of course there is the issue as to the extent to which the survival 
of Soviet type socialism has been helped in practice by the contemporary existence of an 
international capitalist economy, from which to draw technology, as well as goods (such 
as foodstuffs) for whose production Soviet-type socialism was utterly dysfunctional, and 
by an international price system easing the difficult task of evaluating economic 
opportunities.
56 But let us abstract from the latter point. Would it have been enough to 
argue, after the suppression of capitalism, that no better system was possible and to 
ascribe to the very nature of real socialism the economic and demographic progresses? 
In this respect two viewpoints seem to be equally objectionable: that a really existing, 
and therefore highly imperfect, system of production must be rejected because its 
performance is seen as defective, and another abstractly implementable system 
(socialism vs. capitalism) should do necessarily better; as well the opposite contention 
that no better system of organization than the existing one (in our counterfactual 
example capitalism vs. Soviet-type socialism) is possible.
57 
9. Post-war development and the Malthusian trap 
As we have seen, a most remarkable fact is that world population and wealth have 
never grown so fast as in the post World War II period.58 We have considered the 
possible causes: globalization (in particular the great intensification of international trade 
and investment), technical progress (and the progress of medicine), originating in the 
European countries and Anglo-European offshoots, and the absence of devastating 
conflicts at the global level (the world has been on the brink of a nuclear global disaster, 
but it has not fallen into the abyss, yet). The progresses in transportation and agriculture 
have been of particular importance for the provision of the basic means of survival; 
thanks to those progresses Woodruff’s speculation in the sixties that “if we are to be 
guided simply by statistics, then in AD 2000—i. e. in the lifetime of our children—
world population will have doubled and misery and starvation will stare mankind in the 
                                                 
56 Soviet-type socialism appears to have been much less proficient than capitalism in the production of 
consumer goods in general and in the innovation of better consumer goods and better ways to satisfy 
consumer needs in particular The only innovative consumer goods developed in the socialist camp that 
comes to my mind is Rubik’s cube, in Hungary in the mid seventies. However Soviet-type socialism was 
by all accounts no inferior to western capitalism in the production and development of military 
hardware. It was much less efficient and much more profligate in its utilization of energy resources and 
raw materials (see on this Gomulka and Rostowski, 1988). 
57 Following Demsetz (1969) the first of the two views is dubbed as Nirvana fallacy. 
58  This is epitomized by the title of Easterlin 1996 book: Growth Triumphant. Poverty, Population, Inequality, and Development: the Historical Perspective 
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face” (Woodruff, 1982[1966], p. 340) turned out to be correct only as far as population 
was concerned. 59 
Notwithstanding the above successes, for the world as a whole the Malthusian 
trap is still lurking.
60 But rather than decreasing agricultural returns, as in the classical 
explanation, it may here be relevant the pressure on scarce natural resources,
61 and in 
particular the threat against development and living standards of the possible “tragedies 
of the commons”, including climate change, consequence of increased production and 
population.62 The industrial and demographic developments that have accompanied the 
present relative prosperity have taken place at the cost of world’s commons, in 
particular at the cost of the decumulation in the span of two hundred years of huge 
reserves of fossil fuels, the leftovers of hundreds of millions of years of life on earth.63 
To this one may add the destruction of forests and pristine habitats, the pollution or air 
and water, and, last but not least, CO
2 emissions. The plunder has mostly taken place to 
the advantage of industrialized countries, and of countries provided with large reserves 
of raw materials (in particular hydrocarbons), appropriating the rents of their 
exploitation. But the overall balance for poorer and energy poor countries cannot be 
considered as negative, since in the process their average living standards (considering 
both per capita income and quality of vital statistics) have greatly improved all the same, 
as a consequence of the diffusion of the technological advances of the West. But, as 
more and more countries successfully pursue the type of industrialization and economic 
development that has made the West rich and better off the emerging economies, the 
pressure on world natural resources and the generation of obnoxious externalities are 
bound to increase, with potential destabilizing consequences on the economy and the 
peace of the world. 
10.  The limits to population growth: natality, mortality, and 
catastrophes 
Furthermore it is obvious that a demographic explosion such as that of the last 
decades cannot last forever. Carlo Cipolla (1974 [1962], p. 86) quotes “an exercise in 
astronomical arithmetics” by C.P. Putnam (the inventor of the world's first megawatt-
                                                 
59  For the remarkable performance of world agriculture in modern times, but especially in the post second 
world war years, when agricultural output growth was exceeding the most exceptional growth of 
population, see Federico (2005, p. 19). For the role of agriculture spearheading, alongside industry, 
modern economic growth, see Easterlin, 1996, p.5 
60    The extent to which the Malthusian trap is lurking is however controversial. For an optimistic 
viewpoint see Simon (1981). According to Simon “another birth means another mind that can help 
think up ways of using resources more efficiently” (Lee, 2008). On the opposite side there is a vast 
intellectual current renewing the Malthusian tradition, such as Garret Hardin, Albert Bartlett, Paul 
Ehrlich, and the Club of Rome. 
61    Downplayed by Simon (1989), who optimistically sees in technological progress favoured by an 
increasing population the overall dominant factor. 
62   According to a plausible view, very specialized life stiles, such as in the contemporary world, increase 
population vulnerability to dramatic environmental changes; see Chu, 1998, pp. 193-194. 
63   In this perspective the long run survival and spreading to the rest of humanity of the high living 
standards of the most developed world crucially depend on the successful untapping of relatively clean 
and plentiful new sources of energy.  
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size wind turbine, installed in 1941)
64, according to which “if the [human] race had 
sprung from a couple living not long before agriculture was discovered—let us say 
10,000 B.C.—and if its members had expanded at the rate of one per cent per year since 
then [which is lower than the present rate of growth of world population], the world 
population would form today a sphere of living flesh many thousand light years in 
diameter, and expanding with a radial velocity that, neglecting relativity, would be many 
times faster than light.”
65 
A correction to demographic processes leading to world overpopulation (where 
obviously the concept of overpopulation is a hazy one and partly depends on values) 
could be found in a decreasing birth rate, as a by-product of per capita income growth, 
and in the extension of social security systems in the countries where the survival of the 
elderly is still dependent on family ties, as well as in the improvement and diffusion of 
the technology of birth control. Thus, according to Easterlin (1996), p. 112, “both 
theory and evidence indicate that the population explosion is a transient phase of 
contemporary development experience”, since in developing countries “the more rapid 
the Mortality Revolution, the more rapid is the transition to lower fertility”, replicating, 
albeit with different speed and modalities, the demographic transition of present 
developed countries. But can one really discount the possibility that the Mortality 
Revolution could intensify as a consequence of further medical discoveries after the 
transition to lower fertility is over, or that preferences regarding procreation could differ 
as a consequence of different cultural traditions in developing countries, and that 
preferences could change even in the developed world, altering the dynamic 
demographic balance? Indeed,  there  are  signs  that  this  may  the  case  and that the  
long-run relationship between  development and fertility could be in reality j-shaped.
66 
Neither preferences nor technology can really be considered as given in the long-run.  
11.  War, peace, the Bomb, and their economic consequences 
Relative peace, maintained by the nuclear balance of terror, can be seen as a 
crucial factor for explaining Post-War II economic achievements. “Capitalist peace” 
whereby countries interact though mutually advantageous voluntary exchanges 
excluding wars of territorial aggrandizement, which were endemic in the not-distant 
past, is another.
67 Seen from the perspective of recent achievements, the game humanity 
played in the past, when conquest, plunder, territorial expansion and domination, 
slavery, torture and mass killings were respectable endeavours and part of the rules of 
the game, and mass murderers acquired the status of national heroes, still remembered 
and glorified in monuments and history books, has led on the whole to very poor 
                                                 
64 Cf. Wikipedia’s entry “Smith-Putnam wind turbine” and the sources there provided. 
65  A more elementary calculation (2 multiplied by 1.01 elevated by 12000) would turn out an astronomical 
number of humans (1.4 multiplied by 1052) Their annual increment would be a number with only two 
digits less. As argued by Albert A. Bartlett, “the greatest shortcoming of the human race is our inability 
to understand the exponential function” (http://www.albartlett.org/)  and thus, in particular, the 
physical impossibility of exponential population growth in the very long-run.  
66 Cf. Myrskylä et al., 2009. 
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results, as measured at least in terms of demographic and economic growth. However 
the real extent to which wars were contributing to hold in check the progress of 
humanity is difficult to gauge. 68 A strict Malthusian could object that living standards 
and population would have been held in check by Malthusian factors anyway. On the 
other hand as an instrument of population control war was particularly wasteful. It 
produced destruction of capital, both physical and human (in particular the loss of adult 
males in their productive prime, whereas mortality from disease or starvation affected 
first of all the children and the elderly). It required huge resources that could be 
alternatively used for collective surplus creation (which could be employed for 
productivity enhancement: for instance irrigation works) or for demographic 
enlargement. The latter could have led to economic progress, in a Boserupian 
perspective, or through the cultural mechanisms argued by Julian Simon. Personal trade 
interrelations and useful personal contacts between the belligerents are disrupted by war, 
with negative consequences on the economic base, and demographic sustainability, of 
the parties concerned. According to the social-Darwinist vision, war is seen as an engine 
of natural selection of peoples and civilizations towards the progress of humanity.
69 But 
the selection provided by war has tended to bring to the fore populations and 
civilizations notable for their destructive and coercive power rather than for their 
peaceful civilized achievements. At the same time peaceful achievements could be 
dependent on the ability to organize and exert some degree of coercive power: a 
relatively complex societal organization, such as some ancient or modern empires, could 
be apt both to successfully wage wars and to peaceful and progressive purposes, as 
relative to the times. But this does not apply, in particular, to the fierce primitive hordes 
plundering and destroying ancient civilizations and complexly organized states. Here too 
the picture could change, once the hordes are settled and organize an empire on a 
territory that may profit of the relative stability provided by the rulers (such as in the 
notable case of the Pax Mongolica), at least until the next run of invasions, massacres 
and destruction, in an endless Penelopian weaving and destroying the thread of 
civilization. Whatever the reasons, until recent times the progress of humanity, both in 
terms of population and of productive achievements, has been so slow as to amount, in 
our present perception of time, to stagnation, with long spans of regression.
70 The first 
millennium of the vulgar era was for Europe, from the economic viewpoint, a lost 
millennium: the decadence and fall of the Roman Empire and the dislocations following 
the barbaric invasions left Europe worse off in the year 1000, at the dawn of the new 
Christian nations, than at the time of the birth of Jesus Christ. Real sustained progress, 
meaning a substantial overcoming of the Malthusian trap (or anyway, whatever the 
interpretation, of the near long run stagnation, according to a modern perspective, in 
                                                 
68 For a quantitative assessment of the negative impact of war on growth in modern times, see Milanovic 
(2005a).  
69  Cf. Mueller, 2009, p. 7. 
70 An exception could have occurred during the Neolithic Demographic Transition when, according to 
some, population growth rates of 1% and more could have taken place for a sustained span of time (see 
Gary Warrick’s comment in Bocquet-Appel and Najit, 2006, p. 355; Bellwood and Oxenham, 2008, p. 
22). With no improvement of living standards, however: as we have already mentioned the common 
opinion is that actually living standard were lower than under the previous pre-agricultural societies, 
because of longer work hours, less satisfactory nutrition, greater morbidity as a consequence of higher 
population density.  
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world population and per capita incomes), had to wait until the Industrial Revolution 
gradually spread all over the world. But it has been the peace period after the Second 
World War (localized conflicts notwithstanding) that has been accompanied by the 
greatest acceleration in the speed of demographic and economic advance the world has 
ever known in its history. 
12.  Conclusion 
Our generation has had the privilege of living in a very special period in the 
history of mankind. Never in history have material conditions progressed at the rate to 
which we have become used to in the post-war years, never have the different parts of 
the globe and the different populations become so close, and world population 
increased at a faster rate. Never have overall vital statistics improved in such a 
substantial way. Still, an important part of humanity lives precarious lives under 
appalling conditions of absolute poverty, but its relative share, and in more recent times 
even its absolute numbers, have steadily decreased. In the continuation, and possibly the 
intensification, of this process may lie the hope of eventually overcoming world poverty 
(at least in absolute terms). At the basis of these achievements there has been a system 
of production and of organization (whatever its specific variations in the different 
countries and the different times) that has put to the fore the systematic pursuit of 
technical progress, and its utilization in all aspects of economic life, while providing the 
drive and the incentives to do so. A contributing factor accompanying the greatest 
increase of population and living standards that the world has historically known has 
been the intensification and acceleration of world economic and non-economic 
exchange, which is usually referred to as globalization. In a world characterized by 
“capitalist peace” and by the refusal of the autarchic tendencies of a recent past, when 
autarchy was preparing the ground to a disastrous world war, any country is able to take 
advantage of the others through mutually beneficial voluntary exchanges rather than 
through conquest and exploitation. No alternative better foundation of international 
economic relations has to date been credibly proposed. But this same system has also 
brought about the utilization of technical progress for making increasingly more 
destructive the technology of warfare. For the first time in history mankind has 
produced the military technology that has the potential to lead to its own demise. The 
danger of global thermonuclear warfare has kept the world by and large at relative peace 
for more than sixty years, quite an unprecedented achievement that has much 
contributed to the overall positive economic and demographic results. But even if the 
danger appears to have decreased with the end of the Cold War, the potential for large 
scale destruction remains, and may increase with the spreading of nuclear technology in 
presence of persisting or even increasing nationalistic drives, such as by resurging old 
imperial powers. The increasing perception, favoured by globalization, of the 
inequalities and injustices of the world economic order, together with the disruption of 
ancient life styles and privileges, and the recurring scourge of nationalism may put future 
economic progress in jeopardy. Large scale nuclear warfare is always a possibility, 
especially with the inevitable proliferation of nuclear capabilities, with enormous risks 
for the survival of humanity, even short of Dr. Strangelove’s Doomsday Machine. As 
always has been the case in history, prosperity and economic progress are by no means 
foregone conclusions.  Poverty, Population, Inequality, and Development: the Historical Perspective 
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